Support for civil society is not intended for Norwegian organizations

The goal of Norwegian civil society support is that "civil society in developing countries has better ability and capacity to promote human rights, democracy, equality, food security, agriculture, environment, climate, and inclusive growth."

The target group is civil society actors in countries approved for official development assistance, not civil society actors in Norway.

When the head of the Strømme Foundation Erik Lunde and former Norad employee Ivar Evensmo warn that the restructuring will weaken public support, Norwegian knowledge communities, and volunteerism in Norway, they are therefore largely arguing for considerations that lie outside the scheme's purpose.

There may be good reasons for the state to support Norwegian civil society for the sake of Norwegian democracy and engagement. But then it should be justified and financed as such.

The question should not be what is best for Norwegian aid organizations, or what creates legitimacy for the Norwegian aid budget, but what yields the best results in developing countries.

The best path to civil society in developing countries?

Many Norwegian organizations undoubtedly possess high competence and play important roles in international cooperation, but we should still discuss whether the current model is the best way to strengthen civil society in developing countries.

There are few comprehensive evaluations of Norwegian civil society support.

The evaluation From Donors to Partners? from 2018 found that the support delivers locally, but has a weaker effect on the broader goal of strengthening civil society in developing countries. Despite the partnership rhetoric, the power asymmetry between Norwegian organizations and Southern partners persists. The most significant contribution of Norwegian organizations, beyond money, was helping partners meet Norwegian reporting requirements. Norad's own assessment is that the current system has a number of weaknesses, including whether it actually facilitates locally led development.

Studies from OECD, ODI, CGD and The Share Trust show that local ownership often leads to better contextual understanding, greater accountability to beneficiaries, and more sustainable results. Local actors are also more cost-effective than international intermediaries, partly because several layers of administrative and salary costs are eliminated.

In some contexts, intermediaries are necessary because local actors lack systems, or because institution-building takes time. Even those most committed to locally led development acknowledge this. However, today, direct support is a rare exception.

Then the defenders of the current system should explain why this particular distribution best serves civil society in developing countries.

The argument that the largest and most resource-rich foreign organizations will win the competition because they have consultants to write applications also applies to today's largest Norwegian actors: If competition favors application capacity over delivery capability, the answer is to simplify application processes and change evaluation criteria, not to shield current actors from competition.

Who will relinquish power?

There is broad consensus within Norwegian civil society that more power and resources should be transferred to civil society in developing countries. But when almost all funds still flow through Norwegian organizations after more than 50 years of Norwegian aid, it is difficult to describe the current model as a transitional phase towards locally led development. More of the same will not lead to a different direction.

Genuine locally led development means that power, money, and decisions must increasingly be moved out of Norwegian head offices and to actors in the countries where aid is intended to operate. This will have consequences for Norwegian civil society: fewer Norwegian employees will work with aid, and more organizations will have less responsibility and fewer funds. This is not an unintended side effect of localization. It is part of the power shift that is necessary.

When aid reforms challenge the position of Norwegian organizations, arguments about public support, legitimacy, and Norwegian knowledge environments are mobilized. These considerations are real, but they also become an obstacle to a power shift that has been an stated goal for over a decade. That is also why it is right to open the system to foreign organizations. The main criterion for support should be who best strengthens civil society and transfers the most power and resources in developing countries, not which country the organization comes from.

Where critics hit the mark

Nevertheless, two objections deserve Norad's attention. The first concerns how applicants are assessed. Evensmo points out that the administration has historically measured organizations against state standards and prioritized organizational assessment over the development expertise of the initiatives. This is an apt description of a structural weakness in development aid administration, and broader competition will exacerbate it if the assessment criteria are not changed simultaneously: then those with the best application apparatus will win, not those who deliver the best results.

The second concerns the sharpened focus on democratic development. Norad's own knowledge base is honest about the thin evidence for the links in the results chain, and that democracy support works best in stable contexts with strong institutions. At the same time, legislation against foreign-funded civil society actors is spreading. In such environments, a clear democratic profile can expose local partners to risk, and service delivery may be necessary to operate at all. The sharpened focus may be correct, but it must be context-sensitive and continuously evaluated.

Both objections, however, concern how the restructuring is implemented, not whether it should happen. Then only one question truly remains: What functions do Norwegian organizations fulfill that neither local actors in developing countries nor international partners can fulfill equally well, and which serve the scheme's purpose?

So far, the debate has been about public support and Norwegian knowledge communities. It should be about this. Organizations that fulfill such a function will assert themselves in competition. Those that do not, cannot expect to be protected for reasons outside the scheme's purpose.

What must give way?

We should not throw out Norwegian civil society with the 'turning point bathwater' that Lunde fears. But the center of gravity must be shifted to where it belongs: to civil society in developing countries.

That change requires honesty about what must give way – even from those who have the most to lose from it.

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