We need answers about the origin of the pandemic to avoid new disasters

In a Chronicle in Aftenposten four scientists from the Institute of Public Health (FHI) criticize me for overdramatizing and speculating about what triggered the rise of the corona pandemic in the book “The Mystery of Wuhan”. They believe that the evidence points in the direction of natural contagion -- not lab leakage, as I mean.

Still an unanswered question

A central disagreement is about the legitimacy of the research: In the book, I thoroughly document how politics and science have been mixed together in the search for the origins of the pandemic. I am also strongly critical of the way in which the research of a single group of scientists has been used to stop an open debate.

These researchers claim almost certainly that the infection must have occurred on the wet market, despite major weaknesses in the data base and analyses. And it was scientists -- several of them with significant conflicts of interest because they themselves were involved in the research in Wuhan -- who branded the lab-leak theory a conspiracy theory and delegitimized the entire debate. We have to come to terms with that.

Despite disagreement about what the evidence really says, the FHI researchers and I agree on two things: The origin of the pandemic remains an unanswered question, and there is a great need for better prevention and preparation for future pandemics.

This is how we can improve our defense against biological threats

Here are my six suggestions for how we can find answers and strengthen our defense capability against biological threats in the future:

1. Set down an international truth and reconciliation commission on the origins of the corona pandemic. Such commissions have been used in the past to deal with deeply polarised issues, such as the apartheid regime in South Africa in the late 1990s. Here Norway can take a diplomatic leadership role.
2. Set requirements for international standards for safety at laboratories handling viruses and other hazardous biology. Technical laboratory testing, as the World Health Organization (WHO) believes is necessary to detect a possible lab leak, must be required — not voluntary. No one has yet been allowed to investigate conditions at the virus research institute in Wuhan.
3. Create a national biosecurity strategy. Current policy has major shortcomings when it comes to biological threats, particularly man-made pandemics stemming from mishaps and misuse of biotechnology.
4. Strengthen the Bioweapons Convention. The convention has only a handful of employees and no right of inspection or sanction options. By comparison, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has 2700 employees, with the right to inspect laboratories. Violation of the convention must lead to real sanctions. Biological intelligence and surveillance should be a core function of international cooperation, for example through monitoring hazardous biological substances in air and sewage. The FHI's wastewater monitoring program should also be strengthened.
5. Limit access to “raw materials” that can be used for the development of biological weapons. Impose requirements to suppliers of synthetic DNA to screen orders and customers for potentially hazardous sequences. Introduce risk assessment and restrictions on the use of AI models used for biological purposes (“biological design tools”). ‍
6. Strengthen cooperation to develop and distribute vaccines through international collaborations such as the Coalition for Innovation in Pandemic Preparedness (CEPI), the Gavi Vaccine Alliance and the European Union.

We live in an era where technological thresholds for developing dangerous viruses and bacteria are disappearing at a high rate, and we have a history full of laboratory mishaps.

Then it will not be possible to let the origins of the pandemic go unnoticed. If we are to make real knowledge-based policies, we need better answers than we have today and targeted measures to prevent accidents from happening again.