Input for the National CBRNE Preparedness Strategy
13 points to address in the revision of the CBRNE strategy.

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Main moments
The Langsikt think tank is an independent, non-profit think tank working for more long-term policy. One of our focus areas is preparedness and biological threats, and the input in this memo is particularly directed at the biological domain. Part 1 provides input on the strategy's approach and methodology. Part 2 proposes measures with high expected utility.
Several of the proposals originate from, or were discussed during, a closed roundtable on technology-driven biological threats with thirty leaders from Norwegian authorities and research in health, defense, and security in February 2026, organized by Langsikt. An anonymized summary of the roundtable can be shared upon request. The background paper for the roundtable is published on our website: Technology-driven biological threats (March 3, 2026).
Part 1: Input on the strategy's approach and methodology
- The strategy should rank threats and measures by expected utility (probability × consequence), within and across the CBRNE domains. Measures should be prioritized by cost-effectiveness, regardless of whether they address prevention or response.
- A detailed threat description should be added to strengthen common situational awareness among authorities, businesses, and civil society, including technological developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and synthetic biology.
- The strategy needs mechanisms to ensure implementation and follow-up.
Part 2: Proposed measures with high expected utility
Common characteristics of the proposed measures are that they are instrumental (measures 4 - 7), preventive (measures 12 - 14), international (measures 8 - 12) and they address cross-sectoral cooperation (measures 4 - 6).
- Develop a national biosecurity strategy
- Consider cross-sectoral cooperation forums for B-incidents
- Investigate the establishment of a biosecurity council or a similar body
- Develop new emergency scenarios for technology-driven threats
- Strengthen Norway's efforts regarding the Biological Weapons Convention
- Promote international requirements for laboratory safety and regulation of risk research
- Support international moratorium on mirror-image life
- Prepare for the implementation of the EU's proposal on requirements for strengthened biosecurity, including DNA synthesis screening
- Strengthening disease surveillance, including wastewater surveillance and detection of unknown pathogens
- Increase support for research on next-generation infection control technology
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